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Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird visits with Wisconsin cadets at the Air Force Academy near Colorado Springs.

Secretary Laird Tells Air Force Cadets:

"You Are Embarking On A Crucial Phase . . ."

"As we begin the challenging decade of the 1970s, as you begin an exciting and rewarding career, it is clear that we are living in one of the most difficult periods in our nation's history," Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird told members of the 1970 Air Force Academy Graduation Class—some 740 cadets.

The Secretary of Defense continued, "Let there be no mistake. You are embarking on a crucial phase of your life, the life of the Air Force, and the life of this nation. We are engaged in a war. We have serious domestic problems."

Members of the 12th class to graduate from the Air Force Academy heard Secretary Laird explain the basis of this country's National Security Strategy for the 1970s, Vietnamization, credibility and the purpose behind the President's program for peace in Vietnam.

Secretary Laird said, "You graduates of the Air Force Academy, together with your counterparts from the other Service academies and from our ROTC and Officer Candidate programs, will form the leadership nucleus of our nation's military peace-keeping structure in the final third of the 20th

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Pacification Believed Key To Ending War, Says General Barnes

Webster's New World Dictionary states *pacification* implies a making quiet and peaceful that which has become noisy or disorderly. Brigadier General John W. Barnes says he would be the first to agree the term is apropos of Vietnam today.

Brig. Gen. Barnes says pacifying the rural areas of the Republic of Vietnam is probably the key to winding down and Vietnamizing the war. "This is the only way," he says, "that really makes sense, and provides an orderly way of getting out of South Vietnam and leaving behind a country that is free to live the way it wants to live without outside aggression."

Until recently, Brig. Gen. Barnes was in Vietnam as the commanding general of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. He currently is the Army's director of developments in the office of the chief of Research and Development.

During his tenure in Vietnam, Brig. Gen. Barnes converted his command from a unit fighting mainline forces in the

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Key U.S. Foreign Policy Developments Are Outlined

In a June 9 appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary of State William P. Rogers covered key developments in the U.S. foreign policy field in recent months. Excerpts from his statement appear below.

In Southeast Asia, our goal remains—as the President put it in February in his report to Congress on U.S. Foreign Policy In The 1970s—a "just peace" in Vietnam. Since February the President has made two major decisions—the decision to withdraw 150,000 more troops from South Vietnam by next spring and the decision to attack the Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia.

Many Americans have feared that our policy *was* changing. They have feared that we were abandoning Vietnamization and the pursuit of a political settlement, and that we were expanding the war and looking for a military solution. This is not so. We do not intend to retain American troops in Cambodian territory after June 30. We will fulfill the President's decision on troop withdrawals from Vietnam—a decision which will turn over to the South Vietnamese the responsibility for ground combat by the middle of 1971.

We are determined to do everything possible to end this war while giving South Vietnam a maximum opportunity to preserve its right to self-determination. That was our policy when the President submitted his Report to Congress, and it is our policy today.

Our Goal—Negotiations

Our operations, as the President said [recently], have achieved our major military objectives, and will facilitate and ensure the success of our over-all Vietnam policy. I might add the effectiveness with which the South Vietnamese have fought in Cambodia increases our confidence that Vietnamization is the right course to follow.

Our strong preference has been, and continues to be, to settle the problems of Indochina through negotiation. On Vietnam, despite Hanoi's intransigence, we remain ready to negotiate in Paris. When the situation in Laos worsened earlier this year, the President wrote the signatories of the 1962 Agreements—including Communist China and North Vietnam—urging cooperation in the consultations called for under Article IV. And since Cambodia has become the focus of attention, we have responded favorably to proposals by France and United Nations' Secretary-General U Thant, and to a feeler by the Soviet Union made by Ambassador Malik suggesting consultations under the 1954 Agreements. And we have welcomed, as an important Asian initiative, the conference of 11 Asian countries which met in Djakarta May 16-17.

We will continue to press our efforts for a political solution to the problem of Vietnam and of Indochina in general.

On April 16 the substantive phase of SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) began. Both sides have presented their respective positions and are now engaged in a more detailed examination of specific issues. We have put forward proposals dealing with all offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems, including ABMs (Anti-Ballistic Missile) and MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle).

Our approach has been concrete and comprehensive. The Soviets have also indicated a preference for a comprehensive approach, but have not been as concrete as we in spelling out important specifics.

The atmosphere in Vienna remains serious. Some common ground has emerged, although there are still important differences. We are in the early stages of exploring the issues, but it is already apparent that hard negotiations remain.

The SALT talks represent, in the strategic arms area, one aspect of our attempt to preserve the balance of strength at lower levels of cost and tension. Another aspect, in the area of conventional forces, is our effort within NATO to engage the Soviets and their allies in talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. President Nixon, in his Foreign Policy Report, declared our readiness to negotiate on this issue in any suitable forum.

Recently I attended a NATO Ministerial meeting in Rome. At that meeting we reaffirmed NATO's 1968 initiative on mutual and balanced force reductions, with special reference to Central Europe.

The United States continues to believe, as I told the meeting in Rome, that the best way to solve the security problems of Europe is through a step-by-step approach. Such an approach has already been launched in the West German talks with the USSR, Poland, and East Germany, and in the Four-Power discussions over Berlin. Talks on mutual and balanced force reductions would be a useful further step.

Middle East—Problem Area

On Dec. 9 I set out the U.S. policy position in the Middle East. It was reaffirmed by the President in his February report.

Since then, the military situation has deteriorated, largely as a result of increased Soviet involvement in the air defense of the UAR (United Arab Republic). For the first time, the Soviet Union has introduced into a non-bloc country SA-3 missiles and Soviet personnel to man them. And for the first time outside the bloc, Soviet pilots have flown operational missions although there has been no actual combat.

When we first learned of the new Soviet pilot activity, we promptly expressed our concern and asked the Soviet Union to clarify its intentions. I underscored this concern in my talks with Ambassador Dobrynin last week.

We made our March decision to hold in abeyance the Israeli request for more planes in the hopes that it would set a pattern of restraint in the Middle East. Since it has not done so, we have initiated a new evaluation of the situation. There will be a decision on this matter before too long.

On the political front, we have pressed our efforts for a settlement bilaterally with the Soviet Union, through the

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Pacification Believed Key To Ending War, Says General Barnes

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jungles and mountains to a force totally committed to pacification. This was the first time a whole brigade had been committed in this fashion, according to the general.

"Pacification in the context that we understood it and applied it was really turning over all aspects of the war to the rural population," he said. "That included eventual provision of their own security through Hamlet Popular Force platoons and District Regional Force companies which were recruited from their own population and uniformed and paid by the South Vietnamese government."

Brig. Gen. Barnes is convinced the entire pacification idea hinges on self-security. He points out that if American forces provide security at village and hamlet level, the people are not going to be convinced because they know the Americans must eventually leave. "The key is proving to the people that their government can and will provide them with long-term security against VC (Viet Cong) attack and intimidation," he said. "You can't do anything unless the people feel they are secure. This they can see if the platoon that's going to protect them is from their own hamlet population. That platoon is protecting its own homes, its own people, its own rice fields, its own fishermen and so forth.

'We Were There To Help'

"The rest of the pacification effort involves restoration of the economy, the political structure in the hamlets, their school system, their health system, all the other things that make society work." This aspect, too, must be approached from the Vietnamese standpoint, the general explained.

"We weren't in there to make an America out of Vietnam," he said. "We weren't trying to teach the Vietnamese how to be Americans. We were there to help their society work, help them get back on their feet and live the way they wanted to live."

Brig. Gen. Barnes dislikes the term civic action and says the nation-building aspects of pacification concentrate on what the Vietnamese feel they need, not what American forces and advisors think is needed. Too, he points out, it was the Vietnamese themselves who did the work. "We concentrated," he said, "on helping the Vietnamese do what they wanted to do, not what we wanted them to do.

"If the people wanted their school restored, if they wanted their church rebuilt, we assisted their leaders and their political structure in the hamlets and villages to get these things done. All the labor came from the people—our soldiers didn't work on the schools and similar projects. The main thrust was to help the Vietnamese restore their society and their way of life according to their desires."

Years Of Terrorism

The general pointed out the Vietnamese society had been severely disrupted by years of terrorism. He said that one of the basic problems of Vietnamese society today is leadership, or the lack of it. "The Communists killed off the leadership," he said. "The Communist campaign of assassination and terrorism, had it been carried out in the U.S., would have resulted in the deaths of one million, five hundred thousand American teachers and local leaders. We'd have had absolute chaos in our country, as did the South Vietnamese people.

"This is why we tried to work closely with the elected civilian and military officials of the Vietnamese government at hamlet level, village level, and district level. Each of my four maneuver battalion commanders was co-located with a Vietnamese district chief and his staff at the Vietnamese district headquarters. One of his responsibilities was—by example and by advice—to improve the district chief's leadership and the leadership of his staff people so that they could do the things that were necessary in the long term.

"We followed the same pattern at village level, where an American company commander had the same relationship with the village chief; and at the platoon level, the American platoon leader became the advisor to the hamlet chief. Most of the officers and men of the brigade were thus involved in training their counterparts in doing all the things necessary for restoration of a broken society."

Most Of Nation Ready

The general admits that pacification cannot go forward until enemy resistance has been reduced to a workable level. But he thinks most of South Vietnam is ready for pacification. Talking about his own area of operations, he said, "The percentage of population under GVN (Government of Vietnam) control by the end of June (1969) had jumped to 74 per cent from 37 per cent in two and a half months. This is in an area considered one of the cradles of communism in South Vietnam. By the end of the year, this population under GVN control had increased to 90 per cent."

According to Brig. Gen. Barnes, "Once you provide security for the person, (and) he knows he can live the way he wants, he's not going to opt for life under communism again—at least not in the area of Northern Binh Dinh Province where the people know what it is like to live in a society controlled by terror." The general pointed out that control by terror, to include assassination, is proven Communist policy whenever they have taken over populated areas in South Vietnam.

The general said body count and kill ratios were not used by the brigade in measuring progress in pacification. Instead, "We were concerned with and kept score on numbers of hamlets reestablished, refugees resettled, children in school, ralliers to the GVN, and members of the infrastructure captured; involvement of the people in self-help projects which they wanted, such as opening roads, rebuilding schools and churches and market places; increasing social activity in the hamlets and economic intercourse among the hamlets; and percentage of population under GVN control.

"Basically our success resulted from using the troops as advisors, in helping the people restore their way of living under their own security, and under their own local government of their own choice. And to me, that means winning in South Vietnam."

Japan And The U.S. In The Far East

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson explored the role of Japan and the future of American relations with the Far East at a recent meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Excerpts of his address follow.

It is fitting that the 74th annual meeting of the Academy is devoted to discussion of "A New American Posture Toward Asia." Also it is a particularly good time to take a look at the role of Japan in connection with the future of American relations with Asia.

Asian 'Success Story'

Japan's success story . . . first attracted world attention with the supreme effort put into the 1964 Olympics. Japan's vast industrial expansion and its growing volume of exports abroad became the object of much interest and analysis.

The basic facts about the new Japan are well-known.

It has the third largest GNP (Gross National Product) in the world, which is expected to reach $200 billion this year. It may well reach $440 billion by 1975. The Japanese Foreign Office has recently published figures which indicate that the 100-million people of Japan now enjoy a substantially larger per-capita income than do the over 200-million people of the Soviet Union with all its vast natural resources and vaunted system, and that by 1975 the per-capita income of a Japanese will be about double that of a Soviet citizen.

Already the 100-million people of Japan have a GNP somewhat more than double the GNP of the 750-million people of mainland China.

A Stable Base

Japan is the largest overseas market for the United States, importing $3.5 billion from us in 1969, an amount approximately equal to the sum of our exports to England and France.

Much is said about Japan's "economic miracle."

But we should not forget that Japan has established at home a solid base of political stability and democratic rights, including a vigorous press and an independent judiciary.

Japan is, in fact, a striking illustration of the principle that a political democracy in Asia can produce political stability and an efficient economic system. While we Americans can take some pride in this because of our recent association with Japan . . . we should not forget that the roots go back much further in the history of modern Japan.

Education For All

We should also remember that many years ago Japan was one of the first countries in the world to establish universal compulsory education, and that today a higher proportion of its population is in colleges and universities than any country except our own.

All of this means that Japan has reached the stage where its leaders believe it can make new and more helpful contributions to stability and progress in Asia.

The importance of Japan in Asia is clear. As the President said in his State of the Union Message on Jan. 22, "Japanese-American friendship and cooperation is the linchpin for peace in the Pacific." In sheer economic and industrial power terms it is clear that Japan is and will long remain the overwhelmingly important fact in Asia.

An Independent Role

In this connection I might add that the Nixon Doctrine, and the President's foreign policy statement of Feb. 18, met with favorable reception in Japan. The Japanese Foreign Office took the unusual step of releasing a commendatory statement on it.

At the same time it should be stressed that we and Japan are both independent countries and we will decide on our actions in the light of our own conception of our own national interests. Japan in particular has achieved a state of strength and confidence which would make it foolhardy for the United States to seek to impose its will on the Japanese Government and people.

Defense Responsibility

The Nixon Doctrine has, of course, large content in the security field.

Japan for years has been acting in the spirit of self-help and self-government. Japan's already substantial armed forces are now responsible for their country's immediate conventional defense. For other contingencies Japan relies on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. With the exception of a few air squad-

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rons, the United States maintains no combat forces in Japan.

As an island nation its security interests have naturally focused on defending its air and sea approaches. It will take on the responsibility for the immediate conventional defense of Okinawa after reversion.

Accordingly, Japan is modernizing its air defense with the addition of Nike-Hawk and Nike-Hercules batteries being built in Japan. The F-4 fighter, co-produced under a licensing arrangement with an American firm, will begin to be phased into the Japanese inventory in a few years. The Japanese Navy is also undergoing an expansion and modernization program.

Economic Contributions

The Japanese Government and people will, of course, decide the role they wish Japan to take in the security field. In my observation, the great majority of the Japanese reject an overseas military role for Japan—for a variety of legal and political reasons derived from its recent history.

Japan has decided that its most effective contribution under present circumstances may well be to continue to offer increasing economic cooperation with the other nations of Asia and to take care of the local and conventional defense of its territory, including Okinawa after reversion.

Japan has stated publicly its view that it can assist the development of a community of free and independent states in Southeast Asia by making available more of its capital resources and technical skills to the area. Prime Minister Sato indicated this explicitly during his visit to Washington. His ministers have stated that Japan may double its economic assistance programs in five years.

Japan's Regional Ties

Japan has . . . become an important contributor of aid to the region as a whole; its official economic assistance totaled some $357 million in 1968. It is by far the largest donor to the Philippines and is second only to the United States in assistance to Indonesia.

In terms of history and geography Japan stands somewhat apart from the rest of Asia. In the past quarter century, this situation has insulated Japan and made it easier to rebuild the nation with the necessity for only modest contact with its Asian neighbors. It is impossible, however, to consider the future role of Japan without looking at the rest of Asia, and Japan has become more and more an active participant on the Asian scene.

Regional Community

Looking at the region as a whole, the ideal is a community of the free states of Asia cooperating together for their common interests in political, economic, and security fields, with which we are associated only to the degree that those states desire our association. This is the goal set by President Nixon.

Obviously, broadly based regional cooperation in the security field will come somewhat slower and with greater difficulty than in the political and economic fields. However, that it will come I have no question, although it is not possible at this time to predict the path that it will take. As I said earlier, Japan is not likely to play a direct role in regional security cooperation for some time to come.

Better Contacts With China

A word about Japan and China. I think that our two governments have a large degree of identity of both views and objectives in regard to China, although we decide and execute our policies on an independent basis.

For our part, we seek improvement in our relations with China and have taken a number of steps to show our willingness to improve relations.

Japan is also seeking ways to improve its relations with Peking. It has long had an active trading relationship with mainland China, which totaled some $600 million last year in trade both ways. This was, however, not more than two per cent of Japan's total trade.

The Japanese, like ourselves, believe that our efforts to improve relations with mainland China are not incompatible with the good relations we maintain with the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan, nor with our relations with the Soviet Union.

Mutual Concern And Aid

The United States made the decision a year ago that our relationship with Japan for the 1970s and beyond had to be founded on a mutual and increasingly interdependent concern for peace and security in the Far East. On the basis of this decision, agreement was made last November for the return of administrative control over the Ryukyu Islands to Japan in 1972. Our bases on Okinawa will, of course, take on the same status after reversion as our bases in Japan.

The Nixon-Sato Agreement was of historic importance and, we are confident, has laid a solid foundation for U.S.-Japan cooperation in the 1970s. This cooperation, and our good relations with the other countries of Asia, are keys to the success of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia.

Prime Minister Sato has emphasized that the cooperation between Japan and the United States is not to be confined to our two countries or just to Asia. He went on to say that, since this cooperation is between the first- and second-ranking economic powers of the Free World, it should extend over a wide range of global problems in the 1970s, such as the easing of general tensions, the strengthening of the U.N., arms control and the realization of disarmament, preservation of the free-trade system, and the securing of a stable international monetary system.

Optimism For The 1970s

It is a source of cautious optimism for the 1970s that there seems to be growing up a broad community of interests and perceptions between the United States and Japan. We have worked hard to lend substance to the U.S.-Japan partnership concept.

I hope I have not left you with the impression that we have solved all our problems or that the future will be free of frictions. But, considering the breadth and depth of our relationship, I think that we can all take considerable satisfaction at how well we have managed our common interests up to now. I am sure we can do even better in the future. If we both keep trying, I am sure that we can do so.

Secretary Laird . . .

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Century. This concept of peace-keeping is a vital element in President Nixon's National Security Policy."

Highlights of Secretary Laird's address follow:

Let there be no mistake. You are embarking on a crucial phase of your life, the life of the Air Force, and the life of this nation. We are engaged in a war. We have serious domestic problems.

We must end the war and solve our domestic problems. We must assure adequate military capabilities at a time when defense costs are up but funds available for defense are severely reduced and the threats from potential adversaries are growing rapidly.

To keep the nation secure in this decade and beyond, you and I must together do much more than "hold the line." There are tough decisions in the immediate future and it's going to take a resourceful and thoroughly professional military establishment to guarantee the security of this country and to support the decision-making process.

We have to get better performance and more productivity from the manpower and material resources available to the Department of Defense. We have to do a better job in working with the Congress in the development of new force structures and weapon systems. We have to improve the management of contracts for major weapon systems and the procurement of new items. We must continue to attract highly qualified people into the Defense community. And we must contribute to an even better public understanding of what national security means and how it relates to other national interests.

Your profession is not an easy one. President Nixon reminded your predecessors one year ago of the difficulties that face those who choose the military life. He said:

"You are entering the military service of your country when the nation's potential adversaries abroad have never been stronger and when your critics at home have never been more numerous."

These words crystallize the kind of challenges facing the men and women who dedicate their lives to the security of our country. It is our responsibility—yours and mine—to rise to those challenges and to meet them successfully in service to our nation.

Just as America cannot and must not turn away from involvement in the world, the men and women of our Armed Forces cannot and must not turn away from the problems and the challenges that lie ahead. You are leaving academic life as young officers to become directly involved in many of the great issues of our time—issues such as those the President posed last June:

—Just what is America's role in the world?

—What are the responsibilities of a great nation toward protecting freedom beyond its shores?

—Can we have peace if we do not actively assume the burden of keeping the peace?

The President has responded that we do have a role to play and a responsibility to fulfill in restoring and maintaining international peace and security. Our objective is to move in a safe and orderly way from the national security policies of the 1960s to those more appropriate for the decade of the 1970s. The new policies and programs fashioned to attain this objective will have a direct and profound effect on the lives and the careers of each and every one of you.

Consider for a moment some words and phrases familiar today to most Americans: Credibility. Negotiation. Strategic Arms Limitation. Nixon Doctrine. Strength. Partnership. Vietnamization. Zero Draft Call. Isolationism. World Policeman. Inflation. Priorities. Peace-keeping. Peace. Freedom.

Considered separately, these words catalogue some of the fundamental issues our nation faces in relation to its safety and survival.

Considered together, however, most of them point to the basics of President Nixon's Strategy for the 1970s, a strategy fitted to the objective, in the President's words to the Class of 1969, "to make the kind of peace that the next generation will be able to keep."

Our National Security Strategy for the 1970s is founded on three pillars: partnership, strength, and a willingness to negotiate. This is how we intend to fulfill our new peace-keeping role.

You graduates of the Air Force Academy, together with your counterparts from the other Service academies and from our ROTC and Officer Candidate programs, will form the leadership nucleus of our nation's military peace-keeping structure in the final third of the 20th Century. This concept of peace-keeping is a vital element in President Nixon's National Security Policy.

As is true for all broad concepts, the term "peace-keeping" can be and has been misunderstood.

In restoring and maintaining peace, we are determined to avoid isolationism and yet to shun also the role of world policeman. We are equally determined to contribute meaningfully to peace, freedom and stability in the world. The vehicle for this role will be the Nixon Doctrine.

Vietnamization is the first crucial step of that Doctrine. I believe events are disproving the view of those who incorrectly consider that Vietnamization is merely a face-saving way to retreat from a bad situation. If a face-saving retreat were our purpose, the term "de-Americanization" would be a better word to describe that retreat and a coordinated withdrawal into isolation from Asia and the Pacific basin. Through Vietnamization, we are rapidly reducing the involvement of Americans in ground combat. That is a major goal of the Nixon Doctrine.

But Vietnamization as the pioneer step of the Nixon Doctrine is in clear contrast to a sweeping and far-flung de-Americanization policy of cut and run. Under the Nixon Doctrine, we keep our treaty obligations and share as partners with our friends the burdens of peace-keeping, especially through economic and military assistance.

Through successful Vietnamization and application of the Nixon Doctrine, we foster the prospects for our Asian friends and allies to help each other economically, politically, and militarily. We help enable them to meet as partners a common threat with reduced reliance on the United States.

As you know, credibility has been a problem in the Department of Defense. The restoration of credibility is one of the first goals I established as Secretary of Defense some 16 months ago. I did this because it was clear to me that little progress was possible in restoring peace at home and abroad if the

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people of America and the rest of the Free World could not have confidence in America's word.

The President's bold and decisive move into Cambodian sanctuaries—designed to speed up Vietnamization to insure U.S. redeployments from Southeast Asia, and to reduce American casualties—was greeted initially by some with skepticism. This skepticism—nurtured by too many prior years of unrealized hopes and unfounded optimism—is a legacy hard to overcome.

I think the way to restore credibility and then to maintain it is to promise only what you can deliver—and then to deliver it. This is what we have tried to do in all aspects of National Security. Our record on this score is, in my judgment, both significant and visible with regard to the war in Vietnam.

Before he assumed office in January 1969, the President promised a plan for peace in Vietnam. After careful preparatory work, he put that plan into effect at Midway in June of that year.

We all hope and pray for progress in negotiations, and we continually seek successful negotiations in Paris. But the President has promised that regardless of what happens in Paris, we will end American ground combat involvement in Vietnam on a reasonable schedule without compromising our single objective of self-determination for the people of South Vietnam.

Clearly, the President's program for peace in Vietnam fulfills four purposes:

It provides a route to achievement of our stated objective of self-determination for the South Vietnamese people.

It honors our obligations to our friends and allies in Asia.

It systematically reduces American ground combat involvement.

It contributes to the restoration of credibility at home and abroad.

Under the Nixon strategy, we are determined to move from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation.

That is why we are in Paris seeking peace in Vietnam.

That is why we are in Vienna seeking limitations on strategic arms.

That is why we are in Warsaw seeking more normal discussions with Communist China.

And, that is why we are involved in the Middle East in two-power and four-power talks seeking peaceful resolution of that ominous situation.

I am certain that it is now obvious to you proud new young officers that you face exciting and challenging careers.

It is my firm belief that as Americans everywhere come to recognize and understand the full significance of our new strategy for peace, and as they recognize the fundamental role the military man plays in forging that peace, the respect for and the prestige of our men and women in uniform will be greatly enhanced.

You are joining an honorable profession of men and women—enlisted and officer—who literally dedicate their lives to the service of their country. Your country is proud of your accomplishment in completing the superior education provided by the U. S. Air Force Academy.

...Secretary Laird

MEETING ABOARD USS PAGE COUNTY—Four of the top military leaders in the Republic of Vietnam get together aboard the tank landing ship USS Page County in Saigon. Front to rear are: Commodore Tran Van Chon, Chief of Naval Operations, Republic of Vietnam; Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., prospective Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy; General Creighton W. Abrams, Commander Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; and Vice Admiral Jerome H. King Jr., Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam. They were aboard the Page County for the Change of Command ceremony in which Vice Admiral King relieved Admiral Zumwalt as Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam. Admiral Zumwalt assumes his new position in July.

Key U.S. Foreign Policy Developments Are Outlined

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Four-Power talks in New York, and directly with the parties.

The only hope for progress is to convince both the Arabs and the Israelis that compromises are necessary. The UAR should abandon its refusal to enter any kind of negotiations and its insistence on prior Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 lines. Israel should make clear that it accepts the principle of withdrawal as laid down in the November 1967 Security Council Resolution, and that it will no longer insist on the formula of "direct negotiations without pre-conditions."

Policy For Africa

At the time the President's Foreign Policy Report was issued, I was on a 15-day trip to 10 African countries. . . .

Following my return, we announced a new African policy along the guidelines set forth in the Report. We emphasized (1) a support for self-determination rooted in our own American traditions of independence and racial equality and (2) a desire for more active economic relations.

In accord with the first precept, we have taken the following actions in Southern Africa:

—We have closed our Consulate General in Southern Rhodesia, have withheld recognition from the Smith regime, and have continued to give vigorous support to the economic sanctions voted by the U.N.

—We have maintained our arms embargoes into the Republic of South Africa and against the shipment of arms to Portugal for use in the Portuguese territories.

—We announced last month President Nixon's decision to discourage actively American investment in Namibia as long as South Africa continues to rule the area in defiance of the U.N.

In our practical relationships in Africa, we intend to take a more positive approach than we have in the past. However, as the African policy statement said, "We want no military allies, no spheres of influence, no big power competition in Africa."

New Spirit—New Approach

In his Foreign Policy Report, President Nixon spoke of the need for a new spirit and a new approach toward Latin America. On Oct. 31, the President had outlined his concept for a new partnership. First, he called for a pattern of relations reflecting greater initiative and responsibility by the Latin Americans and increased use of multilateral mechanisms for development. Second, he also proposed concrete steps to improve the substance of our economic relations.

We are following through on these objectives. In February . . . a special Ministerial-level Committee to examine U.S.-Latin American economic problems in a Hemispheric framework [was set up].

The Latin Americans used the first meeting of this Committee last month to press their efforts for expanded access to the U.S. market. We are now studying their requests with a view to identifying ways in which we can be forthcoming. The President is now asking Congress for $1.8 billion to replenish Inter-American Bank funds, and has pledged new financial support for the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress. This will expand the role of these hemisphere-wide organizations in development matters and thus enable Latin American countries to assume more responsibility for programs affecting them.

We have also taken two additional substantive steps to improve our economic relations with Latin America. We have "untied" our loan dollars to allow purchases not only in the United States but elsewhere in the hemisphere. And we are urging other developed countries to join in a liberal system of generalized tariff preferences for all developing countries, including those in Latin America.

The developments I have discussed in this brief statement underscore, I believe, the importance of the three principles which the President in his Foreign Policy Report called essential to building a lasting peace. They will continue to guide us in our foreign policy.

RUNWAY SAFETY—U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Clent Houston (center) discusses runway safety in Republic of Vietnam with Republic of Korea (ROK) Army Lieutenant Colonel H. W. Kang (left) and Captain H. W. Yoon at the ROK Capital "Tiger" Infantry Division headquarters. Lt. Col. Houston, 21st Tactical Air Support Squadron, is the air liaison officer for USAF forward air controllers who direct air strikes into enemy targets for the "Tiger" division which is located near Qui Nhon. (USAF Photo By Sgt. Robert W. Ingianni)

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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